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Brenda Van Coppenolle, Leiden UniversityWhat is the value of committee service to an individual legislator? Self-selection and party control of appointments
typically obscure this relationship. We estimate the causal effect of committee service on legislative behavior and par-
liamentary careers by exploiting a natural experiment in the French Third Republic (1870–1940). Yearly lotteries divided
the legislature into groups that nominated members to the budget committee, and we use the random composition of
these groups as an instrument for individual appointment. We find that appointment increased legislative entrepre-
neurship concerning budget legislation but not other types, suggesting that committee members acquire specialized
expertise. Committee service also led to ministerial appointment but not to higher office that does not require specific
policy expertise, such as party or senatorial positions. Finally, we discuss alternative mechanisms, including reputation
effects, political networks, and distributional targeting via pork barrel legislation.W hat is the value to an individual legislator of com-mittee service? How do committee appointmentsindependently affect legislative behavior, and does
this experience improve future parliamentary careers? Schol-
ars have long claimed that committee membership is a dis-
tinct political asset with a number of electoral and legislative
benefits (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Krehbiel 2004; Mayhew
1974). Yet even though a large body of observational research
has explored this, there is no clear evidence for an indepen-
dent career effect of committee service. Some studies have
shown that committee assignment positively affects legisla-
tive productivity, higher office, and electoral success (e.g., Cox
and Terry 2008; Grimmer and Powell 2013; Schiller 1995),
while others find that it has little impact on legislative activity
(Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman 2003),
pork barreling (Berry and Fowler 2016), or legislator careers,
particularly outside of the US context (e.g., Crisp et al. 2009;
Khmelko, Wise, and Brown 2010; Olson and Norton 2007).
Competing results could be explained by the fact that isolating
the independent effect of committee membership on indi-
vidual behavior is notoriously difficult, due to concerns with
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms The main empirical challenge in identifying the causal
effect of committee service on legislative careers is distin-
guishing the effects of membership from selection onto com-
mittees (Berry and Fowler 2016; Broockman and Butler 2015;
Cox and McCubbins 1993; Hedlund et al. 2011; Krehbiel
1991). Committee seats are not assigned randomly. Legislators
who succeed in achieving a committee post might be more
senior, more skilled, or more charismatic than their peers; or
legislators might be put on high profile committees precisely
because they are effective. One significant threat to inference is
that it may be these characteristics—not the legislative office
itself—that determine future success.
Another threat to inference derives from the fact that
political parties often control both committee selection and
career prospects (Hedlund et al. 2011). Party leaders could
potentially distribute committee assignments to incentivize
party loyalty or achieve their policy goals within the com-
mittee, or assignments could be given to party members with
preexisting skills or demand. If the factors behind legislators’
eventual career outcomes are correlated with the rationale
for partisan committee assignments, then this confounds any
attempt to isolate the independent effect of legislative insti-ent Department at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 14850. Brenda
in the Institute of Political Science at Leiden University, Leiden, The
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Volume 80 Number 3 July 2018 / 949tutions. Related to this, there could be several mechanisms
driving the effect of committee service on careers, which are
often difficult to measure and then test with empirical data
(Krehbiel 2004). To resolve such issues, a small number of
studies (Broockman and Butler 2015; Grimmer and Powell
2013; Kellerman and Shepsle 2009) have exploited institu-
tionalized randomizations to identify the individual benefits
to committee service, but these are limited to the setting of
the United States. As natural experiments in committee se-
lection are rare, this makes it even more important to learn
from the few cases that do exist.
We provide a study that allows us to causally identify the
effects of committees on careers by exploiting a natural ex-
periment in the early years of the French Third Republic
(1870–1940). The lower house of the National Assembly,
the Chambre des députés, featured an egalitarian selec-
tion process with a random element that allows us to identify
the impact of committee service on careers in a new de-
mocracy. Periodically, the legislature was randomly assigned
into 11 groups called bureaux, and then each group chose
members to serve on the powerful budget committee. Fur-
ther, the French legislature is an ideal case because the pow-
erful budget committee was the only standing committee for
this period, so our estimates are not affected by intercommittee
competition or selection into different types of committees.
France also lacked a formalized party system, and emerging
parties were not able to confound any analysis of committee
selection.
The competitiveness of a deputy’s bureau serves as a
unique instrument for nomination to the budget committee.
We construct an instrument that is the number of budget
incumbents in a deputy’s bureau, excluding the deputy; this
measures how likely the deputy would be to win the nomi-
nation. This instrument is strongly correlated with com-
mittee selection. These temporary bureaux served no other
purpose than nomination and therefore have no other effect
on legislator behavior or careers than through committee
selection. We use an instrumental variable (IV) research de-
sign to estimate the career returns to committee membership
for individual deputies.
Our research design allows us to empirically test a num-
ber of channels through which committee service could af-
fect legislative behavior and careers. We are most interested
in how committees help members develop specialized skills.
This is a prominent argument in canonical theories of leg-
islative organization (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1990; Kreh-
biel 1991), yet this literature is grounded exclusively in the
study of the two-party US Congress. There are very few micro-
level studies of how committee appointment affects individ-
ual behavior in either multiparty parliamentary systems orThis content downloaded from 132.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms democratizing regimes (Jones, Saiegh, and Spiller 2002; Kreh-
biel 1991; Zubek 2015). Thus, we extend the logic behind this
theory to analyze institutional features in the French parlia-
mentary context, to test whether committee service incentiv-
ized the acquisition of expertise and whether this translated
into an increased probability of obtaining higher office in a
deputy’s career. In addition, we empirically test a set of al-
ternative theories to explain the effect of committee service.
Serving on a high profile committee could provide a valence
boost to a legislator’s reputation (Epstein et al. 1997; Katz and
Sala 1996), could provide a political network with which to
enhance their career (Fowler 2006), or could give a legislator
the ability to target benefits to constituents (Mayhew 1974;
Weingast andMarshall 1988); we address each of these in turn.
Our findings suggest that the value of committee service
derives from the acquisition of specialized expertise by mem-
bers. We first estimate the effect of committee appointment
on legislative productivity, as measured by bill sponsorship.
We show that as a result of budget experience, deputies are
muchmore likely to sponsor future budget amendments. This
effect exists only for budgetary legislation, the topical focus of
the committee, indicating specialized “learning on the job.”
Importantly, France was missing one of the key institutional
incentives that drive traditional informational theories of
American politics, namely restrictive rules, yet we demon-
strate how the legislative structure instead provided alterna-
tive incentives for specialization. In doing so, we contribute
to the growing body of comparative research on legislative
organization in parliamentary settings and add behavioral
implications that complement studies that look at the strate-
gic choice to use restrictive rules in committee systems (e.g.,
Moffett 2012; Monroe 2008).
We then estimate the probability a budget committee
member will acquire higher office in the future and find a
strong and positive effect of committee service onministerial
appointment. There is no effect of budget service on other
forms of career advancement, specifically career positions
that do not rely heavily on specific policy expertise, such as
party leadership or senatorial positions. This reinforces the
idea that committees enhance careers via skill acquisition.
We also explore alternative mechanisms, including network
effects, reputation, and distributional theories. Yet deputies
are no more likely to cosponsor legislation with their for-
mer committee members, a practice that plausibly measures
network-based effects, and committee service has no repu-
tational effect on reelection or choice to stand for office.
Finally, we find that those who served on the budget com-
mittee are no more likely to sponsor future credit bills, a
particularly effective way for Third Republic deputies to tar-
get pork to their constituency.9.186.044 on March 15, 2019 06:28:37 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
2. Groups provided some basis for partisan coordination; however,
the most numerous party groups such as the Radicals were also the most
heterogeneous, and deputies could hold multiple affiliations in groups as
late as 1902.
3. We use the French terminology, using bureaux for plural and bu-
reau for singular. This system was initially used to assign committees in
the National Constituent Assembly during the French Revolution and was
950 / Cabinets, Committees, and Careers Alexandra Cirone and Brenda Van CoppenolleThe contribution of our paper is threefold. First, we le-
verage a natural experiment to provide causal evidence on
the effect of committee experience on both legislative behav-
ior and political careers. In doing so, we contribute to a new
literature utilizing institutional randomizations to study the
link between legislative rules and politician behavior (Broock-
man and Butler 2015; Grimmer and Powell 2013; Kellermann
and Shepsle 2009). Second, by studying France, we provide
empirical evidence of how implications deriving from infor-
mational theories of legislative organization could extend to
multiparty, parliamentary settings outside the United States.
Finally, while we exploit a seemingly innovative institu-
tion, in the form of randomized bureaux, this procedure is
not rare. Lottery-based procedures in committee systems were
common in nineteenth-century continental Europe (Cirone
and Van Coppenolle 2018), and random committee assign-
ment was used for corruption trials in Victorian Britain
(Eggers and Spirling 2014). In contemporary parliamentary
settings, committee seniority rankings and assignment or-
ders are partially determined by lottery in the US Congress
(Kellerman and Shepsle 2009) and the German Bundestag
(Buchstein and Hein 2009), and lotteries are used in other
ways, such as to choose the ordering of private bills and ques-
tions considered in the United Kingdom and India (Bowler
2010), Canada (Loewen et al. 2014), and New Zealand (Wil-
liams and Indridason 2014). More importantly, partial or full
randomization of committee selection has been recently sug-
gested for the United Kingdom, France, and the European
Union (Barnet and Carty 2008; Buchstein andHein 2009, and
in Ségolène Royal’s 2007 presidential platform), demonstrat-
ing the importance of the further study of such procedures.
BUDGET COMMITTEE OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC
The French Third Republic was the system of government
in France from 1870 to 1940. Our study focuses on the most
salient and powerful committee—the budget committee. Es-
tablished at the start of the regime, it was the only permanent
standing committee in the Chamber until 1902 and was an-
nually and consistently appointed throughout the entire re-
gime (Usher 1906). The budget committee comprised 33 mem-
bers, tasked with reviewing the draft annual budget presented
by the finance minister each October. Unlike the more struc-
tured finance committee of the later Republics (Huber 1996),
this group was effectively an independent council outside the
government, with extensive investigative and legislative pow-
ers.1 Members had the ability to essentially remake the gov-
ernment’s budget (Gooch 1928), and neither the president nor1. At this time, the assembly had yet to establish a professional and
institutionalized support staff.
This content downloaded from 132.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms the cabinet could induce the committee to finishmore quickly.
When compared to the short life of most ministries, it is easy
to see why committees were “effectively masters of the exec-
utive” (Chapman 1962).
Parties typically play a large role in the allocation of com-
mittee posts, yet—like many new democracies—the French
Third Republic began with stable legislative institutions but a
fledgling and weak party system. A bicameral parliament was
established in 1875, and France was divided into over 600 vot-
ing districts that under universal manhood suffrage each elected
one deputy to the lower house of the National Assembly. Par-
ties, or rather loose parliamentary groupings, only existed within
the Chamber. Ideologically, the multiparty Chamber was dom-
inated by the center-left Radical party, flanked by conservatives
and center-right progressives on one side and radical socialists
and socialists on the other.2 These parliamentary factions had
no legislative power, and party weakness shielded committees
from being instruments of partisan control (Mayeur 1984). The
absence of a formalized party system helps us to analyze the ef-
fect of committee service without confounding partisan factors.
For the majority of the regime, the selection of committee
assignments was neither controlled by political parties nor
governed by procedures such as seniority or tenure. Instead,
budget committee members were selected by a lottery-based
procedure. Yearly lotteries divided the entire legislature in
groups called bureaux,3 which then nominated members to
the budget committee. This system of bureaux was initially
established to prevent any one political faction from cap-
turing control of this powerful institution. It then existed for
over 30 years, even though it could produce suboptimal
outcomes. For example, the minority in the Chamber could
hold the majority in the greater number of bureaux and thus
create an unrepresentative committee. Similarly, if all dep-
uties with one particular skill were randomly assigned to a
few bureaux, the committee could suffer from a lack of ex-
pertise (Usher 1906). Only in 1910, when parties had con-
solidated, was the committee system reformed to give par-
liamentary groups control over committee assignments.4adopted for both efficiency and to counteract factional behavior.
4. Instead of election via the bureaux, committee positions were al-
located proportionally to political parties, who then filled these slots using
party-controlled lists.
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committee had the potential to influence careers. We turn
next to discuss the specific theoretical channels throughwhich
committee service could affect legislative behavior.
CHANNELS THROUGH WHICH COMMITTEES
CAN AFFECT CAREERS
As a result of this natural experiment in the French Third
Republic, we can explore a set of causal mechanisms driving
the individual benefits to committee service. We take as our
starting point an important question emerging from the
existing American politics literature, which asks to what ex-
tent committees teach their members specialized skills. We
explore this question by turning to informational theories
of legislative organization. Our focus is not on institutional
choice, as the legislative organization of France was fixed
throughout the period of our study. Yet these theories ex-
plicitly map committee structure to a set of behavioral incen-
tives, and consequently can provide behavioral predictions
for how committees affect careers. In addition, we present a
number of alternative mechanisms that could instead explain
the career benefits of committee experience, including repu-
tation effects, political networks, and distributive politics.
Specialization and skill acquisition
Prominent informational theories of legislative organization
in American politics argue that the benefits of committees
stem from their ability to encourage legislators to acquire
specialized knowledge. Yet since information acquisition is
costly, legislatures must provide committee members with
incentives to develop such expertise. Gilligan and Krehbiel
(1987, 1989, 1990; Krehbiel 1991) use a legislative signaling
model to demonstrate that closed rules (or the inability of the
chamber floor to amend) protect a committee’s legislative
proposal to the floor, thereby providing the incentives nec-
essary for its members to ex ante invest in expertise. A num-
ber of studies have expanded this seminal model,5 but all con-
clude that for legislators to specialize, committees must be
desired, durable, and most notably, feature a set of restrictive
amendment rules.
However, the powerful budget committee in the Third
Republic was missing these crucial institutional characteris-
tics. The French budget committee, as detailed by Cox (2016),65. New studies have added resources to defray committee costs (Gil-
ligan and Krehbiel 1990), overlapping generations (Diermeier 1995), or ex
ante rewards to service (Baron 2000).
6. Cox (2016) is concerned with explaining fiscal and budgetary dis-
cipline in the United Kingdom and contrasts the British system after the
Glorious Revolution in which the ministry has sole budgetary proposal
This content downloaded from 132.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms instead resembles a context of noncooperative, majoritarian
bargaining under open rule, reflected in a canonical distributive
model by Baron and Ferejohn (1989).7 The assembly allowed
any deputy to propose amendments to the budget, which
resulted in oversized budgets that often took more than a year
to pass (Besson 1901; Cox 2016). Yearly selection via the bu-
reaux ensured frequent committee turnover, and there were
neither partisan assignments nor systems of seniority to in-
centivize information acquisition. Yet in this “legislative state of
nature” we still find evidence for the acquisition of expertise.
We argue that while legislative institutions need to pro-
vide incentives for learning on the job, these incentives are
not limited to restrictive rules in parliamentary regimes. In
fact, Strom (1998) notes that both proposal power and re-
strictive amendment rules that are key to the case of the
American Congress vary widely across the parliamentary
committees of Europe. Thus we add to a growing literature
identifying incentives for committee specialization outside
of the US context. For example, Kellerman (2014) shows that
executive oversight, in the absence of legislative authority, is
enough to induce committee members to specialize in the
United Kingdom; Bowler and Farrell (1995) surprisingly find
specialization in the supranational European Union; and
Jones et al. (2002) show how multiparty concerns and career
tenure specific to Argentina run counter to traditional theo-
ries concerning investment in legislative committees.
We argue that the French institutional context provided
alternative incentives for committee members to acquire spe-
cialized expertise. First, the system of yearly selection ensured
turnover in budget committeemembership; depending on the
competitiveness of his bureau, an ambitious legislator could
find himself on the budget committee one year and returned
to the assembly floor the next. Once on the floor, the deputy’s
only chance to influence the budget would be through bud-
getary amendments, a process inwhich a deputy would clearly
benefit from prior experience and specialized skills extracted
during committee service. Similarly, the committee majority
also knows that there are no restrictive rules protecting its
proposal from moderation (Monroe and Robinson 2008); it
must instead preemptively preserve its position by proposing
a well-crafted bill that can withstand amendment, which also
requires extensive expertise. Counter to existing theories, wepower to the open rule used in the French Third Republic to explain their
relative fiscal indiscipline.
7. Under open rules, a committee is tasked with allocating a pie and is
given agenda-setting power in its ability to propose a division first. The
legislature is allowed to freely amend this proposal, however, and as a
result the benefits are distributed more evenly across the Chamber, and
the passage of the bill may face delay. It is worth noting that the Baron-
Ferejohn model is agnostic on information acquisition.
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8. Depending on the group, this included some combination of a
founder, president, vice president, secretary, rapporteur, or questeur. Leaders
were mentioned in the national paper, e.g., Le Matin, and listed in the public
parliamentary record.
9. Yet unlike the Fourth and Fifth Republics (Huber and Martinez-
Gallardo 2004; Kam and Indridason 2009), this constant instability was
strategic: unrestricted amendment rules enabled rival parliamentary fac-
952 / Cabinets, Committees, and Careers Alexandra Cirone and Brenda Van Coppenolleargue that committee turnover combined with future indi-
vidual amendment rights encourages investment in budget-
specific skills.
Second, budget committee members were given addi-
tional duties and powers that could provide individual re-
turns to developing expertise (Baron 2000). Members could
conduct financial audits, negotiate with various parliamen-
tary factions on budgetary matters, and present detailed rec-
ommendation reports to the entire chamber before discussion
on any budgetary matters could begin (Lowell 1902). Finally,
even though the budget could be amended, the budget com-
mittee still had a large first mover advantage in presenting
the extensive budget document to the floor, and at the time
this was one of the most significant agenda powers in the
assembly. All gave explicit incentives to specialize, in addition
to any natural learning on the job that could occur.
Based on these arguments, we would expect that com-
mittee members would be more likely to develop a set of
specialized skills. More specifically, here we focus on entre-
preneurial activity, one of the key functions of elected rep-
resentatives. This type of activity is typically measured by
bill sponsorship (Schiller 1995; Wawro 2000) and is one of
the best known measures of individual effort and produc-
tivity in a legislature (Anderson et al. 2003; Cox and Terry
2008). In the Third Republic, bill sponsorship guaranteed a
deputy invaluable speaking time on the legislative floor, re-
gardless of the bill’s outcome. Therefore French deputies had
every incentive to draft significant bills to achieve their leg-
islative and constituency goals. To measure specialization,
we analyze the topic of the legislation sponsored, which en-
ables us to identify bills directly related to the expertise of
budget committee service.
Committees and higher office
In the case of established democracies, it has been frequently
argued that a key way to ensure a long-lasting political career
is to obtain a seat on an influential committee (Fenno 1978;
Schlesinger 1966). In particular, we argue that the benefits of
committee specialization should be most valuable in obtain-
ing positions that value legislative expertise. Wawro (2000)
and Padro i Miquel and Snyder (2006) found that “legislative
entrepreneurs” who engage in drafting, introducing, or pro-
moting legislation are more likely to see success in both pro-
motion and reelection. If committees help train their mem-
bers to be policy entrepreneurs, thenwe should see the returns
to such experience reflected in their career trajectory.
In the French Third Republic, it has been argued that the
committee system offered the opportunity to both rise to
higher office and ensure reelection (Chapman 1962; Garner
1914; Gooch 1928). Gambetta, in particular, was known forThis content downloaded from 132.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms pushing his career agenda while president of the budget
committee from 1877 to 1881 (Zeldin 1993). In the absence
of disciplined parties, committees were important in early
promotion. “If a young deputy can induce his bureau to
nominate him [to a committee], he starts on his political
career with chances similar to those enjoyed by an engineer
in his profession who has passed out of the Ecole Polytech-
nique with a high number” (Bodley 1898, 213). We empi-
rically test this argument by estimating the probability that
members of the budget committee aremore likely to ascend to
higher office in the future. We examine the positions most im-
portant for career success in the nineteenth century—a sena-
tor, a parliamentary group leader, and a cabinet minister.
Two high profile posts on the potential career paths of
deputies at the time were a party leadership position in the
chamber, and election to the senate. The only consistent
form of partisan organization in this era was the parlia-
mentary governing committees. Each faction in the Cham-
ber was loosely headed by a yearly committee consisting of
three to six members.8 Even though parties were weak, serv-
ing as a party representative was highly desirable, for it gave
deputies name recognition, both inside and outside the leg-
islature. Meanwhile the senate served as the upper house of
the French parliament, consisting of 300 members, of which
225 were indirectly elected by the municipal councils of the
departments. For an ambitious deputy, a position in the sen-
ate was desirable and a more stable career path; for its mem-
bers served nine-year terms instead of five. We examine the
effect of committee service on both partisan and senatorial
higher office.
The most prominent position, however, was that of par-
liamentary minister. Here we include all classes of govern-
mental ministers, including senior and junior ministers in
the cabinet, as well as undersecretaries. In terms of selection,
weak parties provided no clear role in government formation
and there was frequent government turnover. Cabinets lasted
on average eightmonths, yet ministerial selection valued prior
experience—as many as half of the ministers would stay on
from one government to the next. Politicians who had not
held a ministerial post were judged negatively by constituents
(Garner 1914), which incentivized the frequent toppling of
ministries.9 This explains why, in the Third Republic, “the9.186.044 on March 15, 2019 06:28:37 AM
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minister” (Dogan 1967, 12).
Alternative explanations: Reputation,
networks, targeting
There are other ways in which committee service could
positively affect a politician’s career trajectory, in addition to
skill acquisition. We empirically test a number of alternative
mechanisms, including reputation, network effects, and dis-
tributional targeting. First, serving on a high profile com-
mittee could improve a deputy’s reputation. At the time, the
budget committee was highly visible, and both its nomina-
tion and proceedings were mentioned frequently in national
and local newspapers. If there are simple reputational ad-
vantages to committee selection, andmembers receive a boost
in valence by serving, we could expect to see this reflected in
the electoral arena (Epstein et al. 1997; Katz and Sala 1996;
Mayhew 1974). We examine both whether budget experience
increased a deputy’s probability of running for office the next
term and (conditional on running) whether it improved re-
election chances.
Second, committee service could also improve the polit-
ical network of a deputy. Undoubtably personal connections
did play a role in career advancement. But the informal con-
nections among politicians, and how these influence careers,
are unobserved and difficult to measure. However, we can
look to observable measures of networking across deputies in
the form of cosponsorship patterns. Both empirical research
and network analysis have demonstrated that legislators who
serve together on committees are more closely connected and
more likely to cosponsor bills (Fowler 2006; Louwerse and
Otjes 2015). If the causal effect of committee service was to
create links with fellow budget committee members, then we
would expect to see this reflected in an increased probability of
authoring bills together.
Finally, distributive theories of legislative organization ar-
gue that committees primarily serve the constituency-based
on demands of politicians and that committee membership
aids in distributional targeting and gains from trade (Mayhew
1974; Weingast and Marshall 1988). Thus the effect of com-
mittee service could be the ability of committee members to
achieve pork for their district. The Third Republic budget
committee was the only standing committee during this era,10tions to dramatically alter budgets, which increased the likelihood of cabinet
dissolution Cox (2016).
10. The lack of a competitive committees system suggests that theories
of intercommittee trading do not apply. However, there inevitably were
other methods of informal logrolling in the chamber, that we do not
address. Instead, we focus on one observable metric of individual behavior
vis-à-vis pork, which is sponsorship.
This content downloaded from 132.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and it was also a relatively imprecise instrument withwhich to
funnel pork back to constituencies, because budget chapters
and their allocations were at the national level and very broad.
To what extent deputies drafted the budget with their con-
stituencies in mind is not easily identifiable. Instead, we ex-
plore if budget committee experience improves the ability of a
deputy to initiate pork barrel legislation in the future. We
examine the category of legislation primarily associated with
pork barrel projects, which was credit and finance bills. If
budget committeemembers improved their targeting through
pork barrel trading in committee, then we would expect to see
an increase in the probability of sponsoring credit and finance
legislation.RESEARCH DESIGN
The unique method of nomination via the bureaux allows us
to use an instrumental variables design to identify the causal
effect of committee membership on careers. Key to our iden-
tification strategy is the nomination procedure by which com-
mittee posts were assigned. Each autumn, the approximately
580 deputies of the Chamber would convene to select the
33 members of the budget committee. First, the entire Chamber
was randomly assigned into the 11 bureaux. Next, deputies
were given their assignment and then met in their respective
groups. Finally, and within hours, each bureau then nomi-
nated three representatives from its ranks to serve on the
budget committee (Barthélemy 1934).
Bureaux were temporary assignments, existing only for
the budget committee selection, and were redrawn each year.
Initially they were drawn up to two weeks before the nom-
ination procedure began, but this was changed to hours
before in 1894. This new, short time frame was designed to
protect the budget committee from corruption or advance
coordination by political groups (Gooch 1928).Wemake use
of the random variation introduced by lottery into the se-
lection process of the budget committee and exploit a dep-
uty’s characteristics within his randomly assigned bureau
to isolate the effect of a budget committee nomination. These
temporary bureaux serve as an instrument that is correlated
with budget committee selection. Conceptually, the com-
petitiveness of the randomly assigned group acts similarly to
a form of encouragement design (Imai, Tingley, and Yama-
moto 2013; Sekhon and Titiunik 2012).
Our empirical strategy uses an instrumental variable re-
search design to estimate the effect of budget committee ser-
vice on legislator careers. More specifically, we look at whether
serving on the budget committee led to changes in legislative
productivity as well as increased probabilities of higher office
and reelection. These sections detail our data, the construc-9.186.044 on March 15, 2019 06:28:37 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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strumental variable research design.
Data and estimation sample
We focus on a key period of party institutionalization in
France, from the regime’s inception to World War I. The
main sample for our analysis, which we term the lottery
sample, focuses on the effects of committee service from
1894 (when bureaux were drawn two hours prior to selec-
tion) to 1910 (when the randomized selection process was
eliminated). The data are structured by deputy-year, and we
were able to find complete budget information for 8,147 ob-
servations, or maximum 1,330 individuals. Table 1 presents
the yearly distribution of budget committeemembers, whether
they had served on the budget committee the year before
(Budget Incumbent), as well as whether they enter our lottery
sample.
Data on individual covariates and career outcomes are
drawn from a data set spanning the entire Third Republic,
from 1877 to 1936. It includes individual-level and district-
level data for deputies in the Chambre des députés, drawn
from historical election results, the parliamentary records,
biographical information, and census data.11 This informa-
tion is matched to detailed lists of budget committee mem-
bers, ministers,12 bureaux assignments, and lists of party
leadership. As a result, we have the full legislative and career
trajectories of all deputies who served in the lower chamber.
Our outcome variables measure legislative behavior and
career success. To measure acquisition of expertise, we look
at the policy-making activities of individual deputies, by
examining bill sponsorship.13 To do so, we collect data on the
complete set of roll call votes for the years 1894–1913, pub-
lished daily in the official parliamentary record, the Journal
officiel (Assemblée Nationale Française 1870–1910). The sam-
ple includes 4,615 bills, and each roll call vote listed the topic
of the bill, its sponsors, and the full set of voting deputies.
Approximately 50% of deputies in our roll call sample spon-11. A detailed description of data sources can be found in the ap-
pendix.
12. The majority of ministers were chosen from within the Chamber
(Heinberg 1931). A small proportion of ministers were not and are not
included in the analysis.
13. The success of a bill could be related to events or chamber dy-
namics unmeasured in our data. Measuring a bill’s success is difficult—
some bills are proposed but disappear from the parliamentary record,
some bills are divided and voted on by parts, and other bills are tabled for
years. As a result, in the French context, legislative entrepreneurship is
best measured using sponsorship.
This content downloaded from 132.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms sored at least one bill in their career, and only 15% of the
amendments in the sample were cosponsored.
Figure 1 presents the percentage of sample bills in each
category and shows the topics that were most frequently
discussed. Further information about these categories can be
found in the appendix (available online), but it is important
to distinguish among the different types of financial legis-
lation. Budget amendments were bills proposed from the
chamber floor to edit allocations within the broad budget
chapters. We use these bills as a natural proxy for budget
expertise learned in committee. Economic bills were less
technical and more diverse; this category primarily included
trade, taxes and tariffs on various industries, and regulations
regarding the rail or marine transport of goods. As these bills
were prevalent but did not feature financial expertise, they
provide a useful robustness check for skill acquisition.
Credit and finance bills, on the other hand, consisted of
singular transfers to finance a specific project and weremuch
more targeted (Besson 1901). In our data, for example, in
1895 a credit was requested to fund the repair of a broken
dike in the reservoir of Bouzy; in 1889, a credit bill was pro-Table 1. Budget Committees and Budget IncumbencyTerm and Year9.186.044 on March 15
and Conditions (http://wAll, 2019 06:
ww.journInc.28:37 AM
als.uchica% Inc.go.edu/t-andLottery Sample?1893:
1894 33 13 39 Yes
1895 33 14 42 Yes
1896 33 12 36 Yes
1897 33 19 58 Yes1898:
1898 33 6 18 Yes
1899 33 31 94 No
1900 33 15 45 Yes
1901 33 16 48 Yes1902:
1902 33 10 30 Yes
1903 33 14 42 Yes
1904 33 15 45 Yes
1905 33 31 94 No1906:
1906 33 12 36 Yes
1907 33 16 48 Yes
1908 33 18 55 Yes
1909 33 21 64 Yes
Total 528 263 49.6Note. Budget incumbents (Inc.) defined as serving on the budget com-
mittee the year before. The lottery sample (our estimation sample) begins
in 1894. In 1899 and 1905, the previous committee remained in place so
that there is no information for selection in the bureaux. These years do
not enter the lottery sample.-c).
14. The expected value of our instrument could be correlated with a
deputy’s own budget incumbency status, but our instrumental variable
Volume 80 Number 3 July 2018 / 955posed for the creation of a telephone office in the southwest
region of Paris; in 1902, an amendment to the existing finance
law was proposed to fund the advancement of teachers; and
in 1906, a line of credit was proposed to fund an organization
to support the breeding of French horses. These were the
Third Republic equivalent of pork barrel legislation and pro-
vide an observable test of distributive motivations.
Using these data, we construct a set of indicator variables,
Sponsor, to measure legislative productivity across types of
bills. We first measure whether a deputy sponsored any type
of bill within five years after committee service and then
construct similar variables for each type of bill, to better
measure expertise and pork barrel politics. We also examine
cosponsorship, by creating a variable Cosponsor that takes a
value of 1 if a deputy cosponsors a bill of any type with an-
other deputy. The variable Cosponsor within Budget Com-
mittee Network specifies that the deputy cosponsored with
someone who served on a current or past budget committee.
We are also interested in the acquisition of higher office.
We define a set of dependent variables, equal to 1 if the
deputy served in a ministerial position, Minister; leadership
post in a partisan governing committee, Leader; or was
elected to the senate, Senate, for the first time within t 1 5
years. By considering the first service we can avoid reverse
causality concerns. In our sample, 65 (5%) deputies in our
sample served as a minister, 141 (11%) held a leadership post
in a party governing committee, and 50 (4%) were elected to
the senate. We look at electoral effects, and here we look at
both the choice to run for reelection and (conditional on
running) whether the deputy was successful. It is important
to separate these outcomes because if budget committeeThis content downloaded from 132.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms service had career benefits (e.g., if these deputies were more
likely to obtain senatorial or ministerial appointments), this
would bias any estimates of reelection success. We create a
indicator variable called Ran Next that takes a value of 1 if
the deputy chose to run for reelection, and two indicator
variables that measure whether a deputy was reelected in the
term immediately following his budget service, One Term,
or two terms later, Two Terms. Models using reelection suc-
cess only include deputies that chose to run.
We consider a number of pretreatment covariates as con-
trols. To measure wealth, we create an indicator variable of
the wealthiest occupational category: Upper Class identifies
aristocratic or bourgeois landowners. Liberal Profession is
a measure of professional qualifications and identifies bour-
geoisie: doctors, lawyers, and bankers. We also create a di-
chotomous variable that measures whether a deputy had prior
experience as a civil servant or appointed government rep-
resentative, called Civil Service. Other deputy characteristics
include Age and Parliamentary Experience, bothmeasured in
years. As district characteristics inevitably affect a deputy’s
career, we include district size to proxy for political capital
(measured by the number of registered voters, Electors),
whether the deputy was from the capital (Paris), and com-
petition (measured by electoral margin, Electoral Margin).
Instrument
The instrument utilizes the randomization of legislative bu-
reaux in the selection process and measures the likelihood
that an individual deputy will advance from the bureaux to
the budget committee. We construct an instrument specific
to each deputy i in each year t, equal to the number of
deputies ( j ≠ i) within his randomly assigned bureau b who
served on the previous budget committee. Thus the instru-
ment measures the number of budget incumbents in the
bureau, excluding the deputy. This continuous instrument is
a measure of how likely the deputy would be to win the
nomination; if many of his competitors in his bureau served
on the previous budget committee, then it was less likely that
he would advance to the budget committee (and vice versa).
The instrument exploits the random assignment of budget
incumbents to bureaux, or whether there were any “free
spots,” which introduced variation in individual promotion
opportunities.14
Other Budget Incumbentsi;b;t po
j≠i
Budget Incumbentj;b;t:
ð1ÞFigure 1. Main categories of sponsored bills, 1894–19139.186.044 on March 15, 2019 06:28:37 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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past budget experience as the primary criterion for selection.
Lowell’s (1902) formidable study of the French committee
system argues that this was the case, and historical evidence
also supports the claim that those most interested and ex-
perienced in this issue area would be put forward (Gooch
1928). While there are no written records of the nomination
process that took place within the bureaux, we know that
it happened quickly, within a single legislative session. The
large legislature with weak parliamentary groupings pro-
vided few natural foci of coordination, and the short timing
of selection made partisan bargaining virtually impossible.
Prior budget experience therefore served as an advantage.15
Recalling table 1, our sample clearly shows that budget in-
cumbents were likely to be reselected to the budget com-
mittee: on average 50% of budget committee members were
individuals who had served on the previous year’s budget
committee. For this reason, our instrument uses budget in-
cumbency to measure the competitiveness of the selection
environment a deputy faced in his bureau each year.
Our instrumental variable research design relies on the
following assumptions: (i) the bureaux were truly randomly
drawn; (ii) the instrument is relevant, and has a nonzero
causal effect on budget committee nomination; and (iii) the
measure does not violate the exclusion restriction, for ex-
ample, the number of budget committee incumbents in a
deputy’s bureau had no direct effect on our outcomes of in-
terest. We discuss each of these in turn.
Verifying the random assignment. The research design
relies on random variation introduced by lottery into the
selection process of the budget committee. There is no his-
torical evidence to suggest manipulation or tampering with
assignment of the bureaux. Still, we tested whether the as-
signment of individuals into bureaux was likely to have been
truly random following a fair lottery. Figure 2 compares a
randomly drawn bureau (bureau no. 1) and any other specific
bureau, within each budget committee year. It confirms that
there are almost no significant differences between the groups.
The few differences that appear are not systematic: they dis-
appear with pairwise comparison of the different bureaux
using different ones as the base comparison group. Moreover,15. The US House of Representatives post-1870 documented a very
similar budget incumbency advantage in its committee system (Katz and
Scala 1996).
strategy only requires that the instrument is randomly assigned condi-
tional on covariates. For that reason, we always present results with and
without individual controls. We also find no evidence for heterogeneous
treatment effects for budget incumbents. More detailed discussion and the
heterogeneous treatment results can be found in the appendix.
This content downloaded from 132.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms we confirmed that the instrument cannot systematically pre-
dict pretreatment covariates determined before budget com-
mittee nominations (see fig. 3). Still to account for potential
imbalances in pretreatment covariates of legislators across
bureaux, we include results from analyses in which we control
for these potentially unbalanced characteristics.
Exclusion restriction and instrument relevance. This in-
strument is valid only if the number of other budget in-
cumbents of a deputy’s bureau is first correlated with budget
committee membership (instrument relevance) and, second,
affects the legislative behavior, higher office, or reelection
only via a deputy’s budget committee appointment (exclu-
sion restriction). While a deputy’s own budget incumbency
status is endogenous and potentially related to omitted var-
iables such as talent or skill, the budget incumbency of other
bureau members is plausibly orthogonal to a deputy’s own
characteristics after each new random draw. It was precisely
the composition of a deputy’s bureau that, aside from such
individual factors, determined his chances of selection at any
given point in time.
First, there is significant support for instrument rele-
vance, as the strong first-stage results indicate. We report the
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistics, which range from 50 to
over 200. The relevant first-stage coefficient of the instru-
ment is reported in the main results table. Full first-stage
results can be found in the appendix. Overall, the higher the
number of incumbent competitors in a deputy’s bureau, the
less likely that the deputy would advance to the budget com-
mittee.Figure 2. Balance in characteristics (p-values). Graph depicts distribution
of p-values from regressing characteristics of deputies serving in randomly
drawn and numbered bureaux between 1894 and 1909, excluding 1899 and
1905 on bureau number. All models include year dummies. Two-way clus-
tered standard errors at individual and bureau-year level. Characteristics
with p-values smaller than 5% signify significant differences at the 5% level
of a given bureau to bureau 1 (the baseline bureau). Full results in appendix.9.186.044 on March 15, 2019 06:28:37 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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were not only randomly assigned but also existed tempo-
rarily and for the sole purpose of budget committee elections.
These groups ceased to exist after appointing the budget com-
mittee members, which eliminated any type of long-term coor-
dination, and they had no other legislative function. There
was no prestige or honor attached to being in a particular
bureau; it was an administrative tool, and bureaux were al-
ways redrawn before the next appointments took place. There-
fore, it is highly unlikely that the composition of a deputy’s
randomly assigned bureau had an effect on any other outcome
except immediate selection to the budget committee.
Instrumental variables regression specification
We estimate the following second-stage least squares re-
gression:
Yi;t p b0 1 b1Budgeti;t 1 b2Xi;t 1 ht 1 εi;t; ð2Þ
in which Yi,t are individual deputy career outcomes, Budgeti,t
is an indicator for serving on the budget committee in the
corresponding year t, Xi,t is a vector of individual controls,
and εi,t is the error term. The individual controls include
budget incumbency, as well as age, district size, margin of
victory, parliamentary experience and their squares; and in-
dicator variables for upper class, middle class, civil service
experience, and whether the deputy represents a Parisian
district. Each specification also includes h year dummies.
Standard errors are two-way clustered at both individual and
bureau-year level, because individuals enter into several yearly
lotteries over the course of their career and the treatment is
similar for individuals within each bureau in a specific year.This content downloaded from 132.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms The instrument employed to estimate budget committee
membership in the first stage for the model of equation (2)
is Other Budget Incumbents, calculated for each i at time t
as a function of their bureau b. Correspondingly, the first
stage is estimated as follows.
Budgeti;b;t p g0 1 g1Other Budget Incumbentsi;b;t
1 g2Xi;t 1 ht 1 ni;b;t:
ð3Þ
A possible concern is that our instrument picks up not
only how competitive the selection environment is, but also
the initial quality of those that survive selection. This is pre-
cisely why we control for observable individual pretreatment
characteristics, including age, experience, career, and social
class. However, to further address this concern, we also pre-
sent our main results including individual fixed effects. Any
remaining effect of the instrument after including individual
fixed effects cannot be capturing initial differences between
individuals.RESULTS
Committee service and legislative productivity
We are first interested in the benefits to an individual leg-
islator that accrue from committee service. If budget com-
mittee members acquire unique expertise, this should be
positively reflected in their future legislative productivity.
Therefore, we look at the policy-making activities of indi-
vidual deputies, measured by the number of bills a deputy
sponsored. Deputies had the right of unlimited individual
initiative and could claim credit for a bill. We find that
deputies who serve on the budget committee are more likelyFigure 3. Pretreatment covariates and instrument. Estimates from regressing pretreatment characteristics on the instrument for deputies serving between
1894 and 1910, excluding 1899 and 1905. All specifications include year dummies. Two-way clustered standard errors at individual and bureau-year level. Full
results in appendix.9.186.044 on March 15, 2019 06:28:37 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
16. If there was no learning and committee service instead only pro-
vided reputational (signaling) advantages, we should not observe these
large treatment effects on budget bill sponsorship. Moreover, we do not
observe similar effects on cosponsorship, providing further evidence in
favor of specialization, not mere signaling.
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mittee service. The detailed estimates for amendments to
the yearly budget are presented in table 2. On average, the
standard ordinary least squares (OLS) results show that dep-
uties who served on the budget committee were only slightly
more likely to increase their future budget bill sponsorship
activity (col. 1), and there is no effect if we account for indi-
vidual idiosyncrasies using controls or fixed effects (cols. 2
and 3).
Yet we see very different estimates when we employ the
preferred instrumental variables (IV) estimation strategy.
Here, those who served on the budget committee are much
more likely to sponsor a budget amendment in the next five
years, with probabilities ranging from 50% to 64%. These are
significant and large effects. They could indicate that the
association between budget committee service and activity is
biased downward (cols. 1–3). Precisely the committee mem-
bers selected were much more likely to increase their legis-
lative activity, as shown by the large local average treatment
effects on those selected as a result of a favorable bureau draw
(cols. 4–6).
The fact that the local average treatment effect remains
much larger after the inclusion of individual fixed effects
(col. 6) suggests that selection of initially high-quality types
cannot fully explain the increased legislative behavior of the
selected and that there was learning by doing as a result ofThis content downloaded from 132.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms budget committee service.16 These results are also not being
driven by budget committee members submitting bills the
year they are also serving on the committee—not only was
this customarily rare, less than 30 bills in a large sample, but
the results remain robust to the exclusion of those deputies.
To further strengthen our conclusions, we next consider
sponsorship of different types of legislation to assess whether
the learning was specific to budget legislation. In further
support of the expertise mechanism, we only find effects for
bills relating to the budget. Figure 4 demonstrates the prob-
ability of bill sponsorship within five years across the range
of bill categories—budget, interpellation, economics, gov-
ernment, and social welfare. This is intuitive and lends sup-
port to the concept that deputies were learning on the job; if
deputies gained specific skills in drafting legislation as a re-
sult of committee service, then we would expect this expe-
rience to be more likely to influence the production of bills
requiring similar knowledge. These results are not only sug-
gestive of the fact that a deputy gained expertise concerning
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Volume 80 Number 3 July 2018 / 959was particularly relevant for those legislators who were lucky
to have obtained those positions in the first place (cols. 4–6 in
table 2). This indicates that the within-legislature career value
of the committee post acts through learning and the acqui-
sition of specialized expertise.
Committee service and higher office
We now investigate the relationship between committee ex-
perience and career success. We examine three types of pres-
tigious political positions: minister, partisan parliamentary
group leader, and senator. All three types of positions would
have been considered beneficial and desirable to a career
politician. We estimate the effect of budget committee mem-
bership on the probability that a deputy will gain one of these
positions within five years of committee appointment. Fig-
ure 5 presents the second-stage coefficient of budget com-
mittee service on each of our three outcomes derived from
our two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis. The three coeffi-
cients presented for each type of career outcome are from
models without individual controls (model 1), including in-
dividual controls (model 2), as well as individual fixed effects
(model 3).17
Serving on the budget committee increases the proba-
bility of obtaining a first ministerial position in the next
five years by as much as 28%. Even after including individual
fixed effects, we still find an increase of 15% in the proba-
bility of obtaining a ministerial post in the next five years.17. Full results can be found in the appendix.
This content downloaded from 132.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms Note that the first stage remains the same as in table 2, so that
the instrument in the first stage is still a strongly significant
predictor of budget committee selection. These results con-
firm the clear link between budget committee service and
first ministerial appointments. Obtaining a seat on the bud-
get committee significantly improved career prospects, in a
relatively short amount of time.
While budget committee membership had a positive ef-
fect on ministerial appointment, this was not the case for
partisan leadership or senatorial positions. We find no sta-
tistically significant effect in any specification, despite the
strongly predictive first stage. Likewise, individuals with
budget committee experience are no more likely to enter the
senate than individuals without such experience. These re-
sults show an interesting pattern—committee experience
helps advance a deputy’s career, but only in terms of the
ministry. So what explains the positive effect of budget com-
mittee service on ministerial positions and not other types of
higher office?
Recalling our first set of results, that committees enhance
productivity through newly gained expertise, it may be that
ministerial selection was more likely to favor skilled deputies
because the role of a minister and his portfolio required
enhanced skills. Further, appointing a former budget mem-
ber to the ministry, regardless of the portfolio, could help
ensure that the cabinet spent the finances as the powerful
budget committee desired (e.g., Cox 2016) and thus solve
issues with moral hazard. It is also likely that selection forFigure 4. Estimates of committee service on sponsorship by category,
1894–1913. Two-stage least squares estimates for deputies serving be-
tween 1894 and 1910, excluding 1899 and 1905. Two-way clustered stan-
dard errors at individual and bureau-year level. Dependent variable is
sponsoring bill within five years of committee service.Figure 5. Estimates of committee service on career outcomes within five
years, 1894–1913. Models are two-stage least squares estimates for dep-
uties serving between 1894 and 1910, excluding 1899 and 1905. Two-way
clustered standard errors at individual and bureau-year level. All specifi-
cations include year dummies. Individual controls include age, district size,
margin of victory, parliamentary experience and their squares, upper class,
liberal profession, civil service experience, Paris, and budget incumbency.9.186.044 on March 15, 2019 06:28:37 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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technical criteria, potentially based on characteristics exter-
nal to the legislature (such as loyalty in local party activities
or the competitiveness of senatorial elections). Therefore we
argue that if the within-legislature career value of the com-
mittee post acts through learning and the acquisition of
specialized expertise, then we would expect to find a stronger
effect for higher office that would require such knowledge.
Alternative explanations
Finally, we address alternative explanations for our findings.
We have shown that committees bestow specific legislative
expertise on their members, and we argue that this expertise
helps individuals obtain certain types of higher office. But
committee service could explain career success in other ways;
it could boost a deputy’s reputation, aid in political network-
ing, or improve a deputy’s ability to target resources to his
constituency. As a result, to explore these channels, we ana-
lyze observable legislative or electoral behavior that provides a
plausible test for each mechanism.
First, we examine whether serving on a high profile com-
mittee could improve a deputy’s reputation. In the Third
Republic, the budget committee was highly visible; it was
discussed daily in both national and local newspapers (Garner
1914; Gooch 1928), and deputy qualifications were frequentlyThis content downloaded from 132.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms invoked in print in the period leading up to each national
election. For these reasons, it is plausible to assume that any
reputational effect of past budget experience would most
likely operate through the mechanism of reelection. A num-
ber of historical references mention the importance of the
budget committee in the reelection prospects of deputies
(Chapman 1962; Dogan 1979; Gooch 1928) in addition to a
large observational literature on committee membership.
We estimate the effect of budget committee membership
on electoral success. We use the same empirical strategy and
estimate in table 3 whether committeemembership results in
reelection in the next electoral cycle or in two terms, con-
ditional on running. We also look to see whether it affects a
deputy’s choice to run for election (vs. retire or seek other
employment). The same set of controls is used, which in-
cludes deputy characteristics, district controls, and measures
of competition.
If the mechanism was in any way reputational, we would
expect to see a difference in either reelection or decisions to
run. However, we find no statistically significant effect of
budget service on reelection, within the following term or
within two terms (table 3, cols. 1–4). Budget service also has
no impact on a deputy’s choice to run for reelection the
following term (col. 5), and this is the case even when con-
trolling for size and competitiveness of the district (col. 6).Table 3. Reelection, within the Next Two TermsReelected9.186.044 on March 15, 2019 06:28:37 AM
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Volume 80 Number 3 July 2018 / 961These findings in particular echo results found by the two
previously mentioned studies that used natural experiments
to isolate the causal impact of committee assignments. In
the context of US congressional and state legislators, both
Kellerman and Shepsle (2009) and Broockman and Butler
(2015) find that committee service does not translate into a
measurable electoral benefit. While committees can be ca-
reer enhancing, they seem to have no electoral effect.
Another alternative explanation we consider is networks.
Perhaps serving in a committee also provides a legislator with
a valuable set of personal connections, and it is this network
that can explain career success.We choose to test this by using
observable patterns of political networks, as measured by bill
cosponsorship. We consider whether a deputy cosponsored
bills together with at least one deputy who served on a (cur-
rent or past) budget committee, within the next five years.
Table 4 presents the results.While there is some evidence that
those serving on budget committees on average cosponsor
more with budget committee members within five years (col. 1),
the effect is smaller after including individual controls (col. 2)
and becomes negative and statistically insignificant after in-
cluding individual fixed effects (col. 3). Using our IV strategy
instead, we find positive but no statistically significant effects
of serving on the budget committee and cosponsoring with
(past or current) budget committee members (cols. 4–6).
While admittedly only one measure of personal connections,This content downloaded from 132.22
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms theoretically this would be the legislative behavior most likely
to be observed, and still we find no conclusive evidence for
network effects. Therefore, networks, like reputation, do not
seem more important than skill acquisition in explaining the
value of committees for careers.
Finally, distributional theories argue that committees serve
as a forum in which legislators can obtain resources or pork
for their districts. Yet in the Third Republic, the annual budget
consisted of national budgetary allocations and, therefore, was
a very broad tool in which to target individual districts. In-
stead, deputies used their individual proposal rights to pro-
pose bills exclusively initiating pork barrel projects. We coded
these as credit and finance legislation and included them
in our analysis of legislative bill sponsorship discussed pre-
viously. If budget committee members improved their tar-
geting through pork barrel trading in committee, then we
would expect to see an increase in the probability of spon-
soring credit and finance legislation. Recalling figure 4, we
find no effect on these types of bills.
CONCLUSION
We exploited a unique natural experiment in the French
Third Republic to show an independent effect of committee
service on careers, an important assumption in past litera-
ture that eluded identification. We demonstrated that spe-











(6)Budget committee .101*** .068*** 2.026 .292 .264 .103
[.025] [.021] [.022] [.287] [.278] [.223]Observations 8,147 8,147 8,066 8,147 8,147 8,066
Individual controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual fixed effects No No Yes No No YesFirst Stage: Dependent Variable Is Budget CommitteeInstrument
Other budget incumbents 2.009*** 2.008*** 2.010***[.001] [.001] [.001]
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 51.77 234.01 79.91Note. Estimates for 1,330 deputies (1,249 deputies with individual fixed effects in cols. 3 and 6) serving between 1894 and 1910, excluding 1899 and 1905. All
specifications include year dummies. Individual controls include age, district size, margin of victory, parliamentary experience and their squares, upper class,
middle class, civil service experience, Paris, and budget incumbency. Two-way clustered SE at individual and bureau-year level.
* p ! .1.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
962 / Cabinets, Committees, and Careers Alexandra Cirone and Brenda Van Coppenollewhy it is valuable to legislators to gain committee experience
in order to further their individual careers. The evidence we
presented is strongly consistent with this learning mecha-
nism: budget committee experience makes a legislator more
likely to sponsor a budget bill and to obtain aministerial post
in the future yet has no effect on behavior in other policy
areas. Our results are robust to different individual control
strategies. Therefore, while more competitive bureaux may
select more stringently on preexisting political quality, our
set of findings allows us to exclude that such selection alone
explains specialization.
We also explored alternative channels, such as reputation,
network effects, and pork barrel legislation, but find no re-
sults. Legislators see no electoral benefits, as reflected in re-
election probabilities, and are no more likely to cosponsor
with budget members or initiate pork barrel legislation. Yet it
is possible that budget committee members developed an
internal reputation and therefore provided focal points for
legislative coalition building. It equally could be that this
internal reputation also helped legislators secure ministerial
posts, not only because they were viewed as being effective
but also because appointing a former budget member to the
ministry solved moral hazard problems by ensuring that the
ministry spent the finances as the budget committee in-
tended (e.g., Cox 2016). However, this focality would still be
activated by expertise; we find no effect on cosponsorship
within past budget committee networks or career progres-
sion in roles where focality could be similarly useful but does
not require specialization (e.g., party leadership or senatorial
positions). Taken together, we conclude that specialized
skills drive the value of committee service.
One contribution of this paper is to explain information
acquisition in the absence of restrictive amendment rules.
Another contribution is to demonstrate that there can be
incentives for specialization across varying parliamentary
systems. This study underlines the importance of applying
and testing theories of committee specialization beyond the
US context and joins a growing literature using microlevel
data to advance the comparative study of legislative institu-
tions. Finally, knowing the potentially positive effect of com-
mittee service on individual legislators also brings up a larger
debate about what types of selection mechanisms to use
(Cirone and Van Coppenolle 2016). It is clear that the bu-
reaux system expanded the opportunities for expertise ac-
quisition across the many deputies within the assembly. Even
in the absence of a party-controlled selection or amendment
process, individual career incentives led legislators to spe-
cialize. Overall, our results show the importance of commit-
tees as a stepping stone to higher office, even in the absence of
disciplined party institutions.This content downloaded from 132.22
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